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Abstract
The number of Americans serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) has grown rapidly
over the past generation and now exceeds 50,000. Yet, little empirical research has been conducted on the
determinants of LWOP sentences. The dearth of research on LWOP sentencing stands in sharp contrast to the
many dozens of studies that have been conducted on the determinants of death sentences–studies that have
consistently found that race, gender, and other questionable factors may influence sentencing outcomes. The
present study is the first to employ a similar methodology to identify both case- and county-level variables that
are correlated with the imposition of discretionary LWOP sentences. More specifically, we have assessed the
relationship between fifty different variables and LWOP decisions in 450 homicide cases in Wisconsin between
2001 and 2018. In our final model, we find seven variables that are correlated with sentencing outcomes. Of

particular note, we find that judge and prosecutor personal characteristics are statistically significant correlates
of LWOP decisions. We also find a significantly greater likelihood that LWOP sentences will be imposed in
counties that are more Republican. We conclude with a proposal for a new LWOP sentencing process that may
help to ensure that this very severe sentence is reserved for the most serious crimes committed by the most
dangerous defendants.

I. Introduction
The number of Americans serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") has grown rapidly
over the past generation and now exceeds 50,000. Yet, little empirical research has been conducted on the
determinants of LWOP sentences. The dearth of research on LWOP sentencing stands in sharp contrast to the
many dozens of studies that have been conducted on the determinants of death sentences–studies that have
consistently found that race, gender, and other questionable factors may influence sentencing outcomes. The
present study is the first to employ a similar methodology to identify both case‐ and county‐level variables that
are correlated with the imposition of discretionary LWOP sentences. More specifically, we have assessed the
relationship between fifty different variables and LWOP decisions in 450 homicide cases in Wisconsin between
2001 and 2018. In our final model, we find seven variables that are correlated with sentencing outcomes. Of
particular note, we find that judge and prosecutor personal characteristics are statistically significant correlates
of LWOP decisions. We also find a significantly greater likelihood that LWOP sentences will be imposed in
counties that are more Republican. We conclude with a proposal for a new LWOP sentencing process that may
help to ensure that this very severe sentence is reserved for the most serious crimes committed by the most
dangerous defendants.
"[D]eath is different," the Supreme Court has declared.1 The unique irrevocability of the death penalty has been
invoked to justify a unique set of constitutional safeguards that are intended to ensure that death sentences are
reserved for the proverbial "worst of the worst"—for "those offenders," as the Court has put it, "who commit 'a
narrow category of the most serious crimes' and whose extreme culpability makes them 'the most deserving of
execution.'"2 Yet, despite these special safeguards, a large body of empirical research consistently finds that
capital sentencing decisions are affected by race and other dubious factors.3
Echoing its death‐is‐different jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has begun to recognize that the sentence of life
without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") may also be a distinctly harsh sentence that warrants special
constitutional treatment. As the Court has observed:
[L]ife without parole is the second most severe penalty permitted by law. It is true that a death sentence
is unique in its severity and irrevocability; yet life without parole sentences share some characteristics
with death sentences that are shared by no other sentences. The State does not execute the offender
sentenced to life without parole, but the sentence alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is
irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except
perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the
sentence.4
Despite this recognition of LWOP's harshness, the Court has thus far declined to adopt special restrictions on its
use except in relation to juvenile defendants.5
If, as the Supreme Court has indicated, LWOP is similar to death in its severity, then evidence that LWOP
sentencing is similarly influenced by inappropriate or questionable considerations might warrant comparable
efforts to minimize those influences, either as a matter of constitutional adjudication or one of statutory reform.
Yet, no prior research has subjected adult LWOP sentencing to the same sort of systematic quantitative analysis
that has been performed repeatedly on capital sentencing.6

There are plausible reasons to suspect that LWOP sentencing would reflect influences that are similar to those
that shape capital sentencing. After all, the death penalty is constitutionally limited to cases of murder,7 and the
great majority of LWOP sentences are also imposed for that same offense.8 LWOP sentencing dynamics would
therefore typically involve many of the same factors as capital sentencing dynamics—a tragic loss of life,
bereaved family members, heightened media attention, and so forth. Yet, there may also be reasons to think
that LWOP sentencing is systematically different than capital sentencing. Perhaps most importantly, while juries
have a constitutionally mandated role in capital sentencing,9 no such role exists in LWOP sentencing—typically
leaving the judge as the key decider. In contrast to a lay jury, a trained, experienced legal professional might
plausibly attend more closely to the legally mandated sentencing criteria and more reliably avoid inappropriate
influences. On the other hand, given the political realities facing an elected judiciary10—especially in high‐profile
murder cases11—the gap between jury and judge sentencing practices might turn out to be less than expected.
Whatever the particular dynamics of LWOP sentencing, there can be no question that the phenomenon has
been of growing importance. There are more than 50,000 prisoners currently serving LWOP sentences in the
United States,12 representing a more than four‐fold increase since the early 1990s.13 Strikingly, LWOP was not
even an option in most states in 1970, but is now authorized in all but one.14 The use of LWOP far outstrips use
of the death penalty, which has been in long‐term decline since the 1990s and is now typically imposed in fewer
than 100 cases per year.15 At last count, 2,703 individuals sat on America's death rows16—amounting to barely 5
percent of the nation's LWOP population.
Each LWOP sentence imposed today will carry heavy, long‐term fiscal and human costs. For instance, taking into
account the expenses of caring for elderly prisoners—many of whom suffer from chronic medical conditions17—
whole‐life sentences have been estimated to cost taxpayers about $1 million on average.18 There are, in short,
compelling reasons for judges, lawyers, and policymakers to want to get LWOP sentencing right.
Against this backdrop, we offer the first analytically rigorous quantitative study of discretionary LWOP
sentencing.19 More specifically, we focus on LWOP sentencing in the state of Wisconsin. When an individual is
convicted in Wisconsin of first‐degree intentional homicide—the state's analog to the offense known as "first‐
degree murder" in many other jurisdictions—the judge must choose between a sentence of life without the
possibility of release and life with a possibility of release.20 We have gathered data on all cases in which a
defendant was convicted of this offense between the start of 2001 and early 2018.21 Using sentence imposed
(i.e., "life with" vs. "life without") as our dependent variable, we have assessed the impact of 50 different
independent variables, including characteristics of the defendant, victim, judge, prosecutor, defense lawyer, and
county of prosecution.22
In our final regression model, we find a statistically significant relationship between the sentence imposed and
seven independent variables.23 Some of these variables are plainly appropriate considerations pertaining to
offense severity and criminal history. Notably, we did not find any main or direct effects of race of defendant or
race of victim in LWOP sentencing. Nonetheless, some of our statistically significant variables are troubling,
particularly those relating to the backgrounds of the judge and prosecutor. Additionally, we find that the
partisan political orientation of the county of prosecution also seems to affect sentencing patterns, which may
raise concerns about a lack of statewide uniformity in the use of LWOP.
The article proceeds as follows. Section II summarizes the prior empirical research on both capital and
noncapital sentencing. Section III details Wisconsin's sentencing system for first‐degree intentional homicide.
Although Wisconsin's system is in some respects unusual, we show it to be closely analogous to that used for
first‐degree murder in 10 other states, and to present significant similarities to aspects of what is found in more
than a dozen others. Section IV describes our data and analytical methodology. Section V presents our results.
Finally, Section VI considers implications for policy.

II. Prior Research on Determinants of Sentencing Outcomes
A large body of research produced over several decades has attempted to identify the determinants of capital
and noncapital sentencing outcomes by employing the tools of multivariate regression analysis. In this section,
we first provide a general overview of this area of research, and then summarize key findings from prior studies.
We conclude by considering what findings might be expected in our study based on the extant research.

A Overview: Quantitative Sentencing Research

The quantitative empirical research on capital and noncapital sentencing has proceeded along two parallel
tracks, with surprisingly little cross‐referencing of studies from one subfield to the other. Nonetheless, the
studies in both areas—capital and noncapital—tend to employ similar analytical strategies. First, a dependent
variable is identified based on the sentencing outcome of interest. Depending on the study, the dependent
variable would be either imposition of a death sentence (yes or no), imposition of an incarceration sentence (yes
or no), or the length of an incarceration sentence. Then, several independent variables are identified, typically
including variables relating to offense severity, defendant criminal history, and defendant race and gender. In
addition to this standard suite of independent variables, most studies include a variety of additional variables
reflecting, for instance, the particular analytical interests of the researchers and the availability of different
categories of supplemental data in the relevant jurisdiction. Finally, the researchers use statistical modeling
techniques to determine whether there is a significant relationship between each independent variable and the
dependent variable, statistically controlling for the other independent variables. In most prior studies—and also
for our purposes—"significance" is understood to mean that there is less than a 5 percent likelihood that an
apparent relationship between variables is due to random variability or chance.
A central objective of much of the research has been to determine whether and, if so, to what extent sentencing
outcomes are associated with certain considerations of particular concern. Broadly speaking, the factors that
drive sentencing outcomes may be divided into three categories. First, there are factors that are generally
recognized as appropriate. These include the defendant's criminal history and the severity of the harm that was
caused or intended by the defendant.24 Second, on the other end of the spectrum, are factors that are generally
recognized as inappropriate, including race, gender, ethnicity, and religion.25 Finally, there are a host of factors
of questionable appropriateness. These are factors that do not relate clearly and directly to the
blameworthiness of the offense or the future dangerousness of the defendant, but that might nonetheless be
rationally justified as considerations at sentencing. Reasonable minds can and do differ as to their
appropriateness. For instance, one much discussed example would be mode of conviction. Defendants who are
convicted at trial normally receive longer sentences than otherwise similar defendants who plead guilty.26 Mode
of conviction has no strong, clear relationship to offense severity or defendant dangerousness, but might
arguably be appropriate to take into account at sentencing so as to encourage guilty pleas and enhance system
efficiency.27 On the other hand, the practice also has its critics, who argue, among other things, that excessive
"trial penalties" can induce even innocent defendants to plead guilty.28 In any event, while empirical research
alone cannot resolve the normative questions about how much weight, if any, should be given to such
questionable sentencing factors, such research can helpfully inform the debate by uncovering the realities of
current practice.
One final aspect of the existing knowledge base bears emphasis: the great majority of the existing studies are
single‐state studies. Although such studies are able to estimate the impact of county‐level variation within the
state, for example, variation as to county crime rates or voting patterns, they are unable to assess the impact of
state‐level variation, for example, variation in sentencing laws or judicial selection methods.29 Moreover, the
research is concentrated in a small number of states, based largely on the availability of relevant data in those
states, while many other states have been the subject of few, if any, high‐quality, published empirical studies.

Great care must be taken when attempting to generalize from single‐state studies. While the total volume of
empirical sentencing research is large, there remains a great need for replication in the many states that have
not been subject to careful study in this area in recent years—including, we may note, Wisconsin.

B Capital Sentencing

Many researchers have explored the impact of defendant demographics—particularly gender, race, and age—on
decisions to seek or impose the death penalty in cases of murder. The most well‐established finding relates to
gender, specifically, that female defendants are less likely to receive the death penalty than mare ale defendants
in cases that otherwise appear similar. For instance, a study of the outcomes in 205 death‐eligible cases in
Connecticut found that the second‐most important factor (behind only place of prosecution) was whether the
defendant was a woman, which reduced the likelihood of capital punishment by more than 15 percentage
points.30 Likewise, a study of 5,320 homicide cases in Ohio found that male defendants were about three times
more likely to receive the death penalty than female defendants.31
There is less evidence to support the view that defendant race, in and of itself, affects the death penalty once
accounting for other variables. For instance, out of 36 studies completed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, only
four found that defendant race had an impact on outcomes after controlling for other variables.32
Research also indicates that defendant age may sometimes affect capital sentencing. Age has not been studied
as extensively as race and gender, but a few studies do find that younger defendants are less likely to be
sentenced to death than are older defendants. Indeed, one study of North Carolina found that each additional
year of the defendant's age increased the odds of a death sentence by about 3 percent on average.33 This finding
suggests that younger defendants may be viewed as less culpable or as more amenable to rehabilitation than
older defendants.34
There seems even stronger evidence that victim demographics matter. As to race, many studies find that
defendants are more likely to receive the death penalty when the victim is white in comparison with other racial
categories.35 Likewise, much research indicates that capital punishment is more frequently imposed when the
victim is female.36 Some research also suggests that the death penalty may be more likely when the victim is
young,37 although this finding is not as well‐established in the literature.38
Researchers consistently find that place of prosecution—typically assessed at the county level—can matter a
great deal in capital murder cases. For instance, in Connecticut, one researcher using a number of different
regression models found that "the single most important influence from 1973 to 2007 explaining whether a
death‐eligible defendant would be sentenced to death was whether the crime occurred in Waterbury."39 Indeed,
while only 2.6 percent of the death‐eligible cases outside Waterbury resulted in a death sentence, the
comparable figure in Waterbury was more than an order of magnitude higher at 33.3 percent.40
While the strength of the "Waterbury effect" in Connecticut may be exceptional, studies in other states have
revealed geographic disparities to be a "pervasive" feature in the administration of the death penalty.40
Researchers have attempted to unpack these disparities and identify the county‐level political and demographic
variables that are especially associated with higher death‐sentencing rates. In particular, some studies find a
significantly higher likelihood of a death sentence in counties that are more rural, more politically conservative,
and less racially diverse.41 Such findings, however, are far from uniform.42
A few researchers have assessed the impact of electoral pressures on death sentences. For instance, in
Nebraska, researchers found no relationship between the imminence of a district attorney's reelection date and
the likelihood that a death sentence would be sought.43 By contrast, in a study of 26 state supreme courts, a
significant relationship was found between the imminence of a justice's reelection date and the likelihood that

the justice would vote to affirm a death sentence.44 The researchers also found that Republican justices were
significantly more likely to affirm.45
Some researchers have also explored attorney variables. For instance, in the Nebraska study, a correlation was
found between the likelihood of a death sentence and the prosecutor's number of prior capital trials.46 By
contrast, the researchers found no significant relationship between death sentences and the experience level of
the defense lawyer.47 However, in a study of Harris County (Houston), Texas, a significant relationship was found
between the likelihood of a death sentence and whether the defense lawyer was court‐appointed, as opposed
to privately retained.48
As we will see in the next section, much of the research on noncapital sentencing attempts to assess the impact
of offense severity on sentencing outcomes. In the capital context, it is more difficult to identify and analyze
appropriate variables that differentiate cases by offense severity, since all the cases under review involve what
is often seen as the most serious offense—first‐degree murder or the like. A variety of offense variables have
been found in some studies to have a statistically significant relationship with the death penalty, but findings in
this area tend not to be replicated with consistency across jurisdictions and time periods.49 By contrast, several
studies do find a significant link between sentencing and a defendant's criminal history. This relationship is
especially pronounced when the defendant has prior convictions for violence.50
In sum, the research evidence strongly suggests that capital sentencing has been influenced by a number of
factors that are often regarded as inappropriate, including defendant gender, victim race, and victim gender.
Additionally, the research also consistently points to a significant role for another factor that is of at least
questionable appropriateness: county of prosecution.51 Finally, a relatively small number of studies point to
some possible impact of electoral pressures and lawyer variables.

C Noncapital Sentencing

A large, parallel body of research has identified a wide range of factors that are associated with sentencing
outcomes in noncapital cases. In many respects, the findings echo those that we have considered in the area of
capital sentencing, although the case sets differ in some important ways. For instance, as already noted, the
noncapital cases encompass a much wider range of offense severity, including all manner of violent, property,
drug, and other offenses. Additionally, victim variables are normally not considered in the noncapital studies,
both because many of the crimes (e.g., drug crimes) do not have victims in a conventional sense and because,
even in cases that do involve clear victimization, victim data tend not to be as readily available in relation to
thefts, robberies, sexual assaults, and so forth as in relation to homicides.52 Finally, it should be recalled that
while capital sentencing decisions are normally made by juries, noncapital sentencing is typically in the hands of
judges,53 which may increase the relevance of judge‐level variables, such as political ideology or years of
experience on the bench.
As in the death‐penalty area, many empirical studies of sentencing attempt to isolate the unique contributions
of defendant race, gender, and age in explaining variation across sentencing. Indeed, with respect to race, one
recent review of the research noted: "No issue has received more attention in the scholarly literature on
sentencing than whether nonwhite defendants are treated more harshly than similarly situated whites."54 The
authors summarized the current state of the research as follows:
[A]fter accounting for offense severity and criminal history, there is often a small but significant
punishment gap between black and white defendants in the decision to imprison, to the detriment of
blacks... We can draw no firm conclusions about the sentencing of Native Americans. Evidence from
federal courts indicates that Asian defendants do not receive harsher sentences than whites and for
some offense types may receive more lenient sentences. [Additionally], sentencing disparities are often

conditional on other defendant attributes. Punishments are often most severe for young, minority
men.55
The authors further observe that black‐white disparities are most well‐established with respect to the "in/out"
decision (i.e., whether to sentence a defendant to incarceration vs, community supervision), but are less
consistently found with respect to the length of prison sentences.56 Finally, they note evidence that the
magnitude of racial disparities in sentencing has declined over time.57
Meanwhile, with respect to gender, "a persistent finding ... is that female defendants are treated more leniently
than male defendants."58 As with race, gender seems to play a more important role as to the in/out decision
than as to sentence length.59
As to age, the available research presents a paradox. Although most studies find that age correlates with
sentencing outcomes, there is no consistency as to the direction of age effects—some studies find that younger
defendants are the ones who are disadvantaged, while others, as in the capital context, find that older
defendants tend to receive harsher outcomes.60
As noted above, victim variables have been studied much less often in the noncapital than the capital context,
but a few studies do suggest that such variables may play a significant role in the sentencing of noncapital
victimizing crimes. For instance, research in Texas has found longer sentences for defendants who commit
violent crimes against women, in comparison with those who violently victimize men.61 Other research finds
longer sentences on average in cases involving vulnerable victims, such as the very young or the disabled,62 and
shorter sentences on average in cases in which the victim had a criminal record.63 However, not all studies have
found victim variables to be significant.64
As in capital cases, research shows that place of prosecution can have an important impact on noncapital
sentencing outcomes. A 2012 review of the literature concluded that "substantial evidence exists that what kind
of sentence one gets, and the factors that predict why one gets it, in significant part depend on where one is
sentenced."65 More recent studies have done nothing to cast this conclusion into doubt.66 The research points to
a variety of place‐based considerations that may affect sentencing decisions, but—as with the research on
capital sentencing—few are consistently found to be statistically significant across studies.67
By contrast, researchers do consistently find offense type, offense severity, and defendant criminal history to be
important factors in sentencing. Indeed, it has been asserted that "there is near unanimous agreement that
offense severity and prior record are the primary determinants of sentencing outcomes."68
Several studies have examined whether sentencing outcomes are affected by type of defense counsel, that is,
privately paid versus court‐appointed. However, results have been mixed, with no clear advantage established
for one type of lawyer over the other.69
Some studies also indicate that the prosecutor may matter for sentencing outcomes. Indeed, one study in the
federal system suggests that the identity of the prosecutor may have a greater impact on cases than the identity
of the judge.70 Controlling for various case and defendant variables, the researchers found that sentences could
vary by about a full year based on the prosecutor.71 As for electoral considerations, one study in Florida found a
statistically significant increase in prison admissions in years in which a local incumbent state's attorney was up
for reelection—but, interestingly, a decrease in the average length of prison terms for white defendants.72
More of the sentencing research has focused on judges than on defense lawyers or prosecutors. Some studies
suggest that somewhere in the range of 6 to 14 percent of the variation in sentencing outcomes may be
attributable to the judge.73 On the question of whether minority judges sentence more leniently—either
generally as to all defendants or specifically as to defendants of their own racial or ethnic group—results have

been inconsistent.74 As to gender, there is some evidence of a "chivalry effect," that is, male judges sentencing
female defendants more leniently than female judges do.75 When it comes to electoral pressures, some studies
find that judges tend to impose longer sentences as their reelection date looms.76 For instance, one recent study
in Washington State concluded that "sentencing of serious offenses becomes more severe as elections
approach: sentence lengths increase by about 10 percent between the beginning and end of a judge's political
cycle."77
Another variable that has been heavily studied is the mode of conviction: trial versus guilty plea. Researchers
regularly find that defendants who are convicted after a trial receive longer sentences than otherwise similar
defendants who plead guilty. One recent review of the literature concluded: "The trial penalty is consistently
found across jurisdictions, offense types, and over time, and it is among the most robust findings in the
empirical sentencing literature."78 Studies typically find that defendants who go to trial face a two‐ to six‐fold
increase in the odds of imprisonment and sentence lengths that are 15 to 60 percent longer.79
In sum, the noncapital research, like the capital research, raises concerns about race and gender influences at
sentencing. Notably, however, the evidence of such influences is much stronger for in/out decisions than
sentence‐length decisions. This suggests that in relatively low‐level, routine cases, sentencing judges may be
more likely to fall back on race and gender stereotypes, but that in more serious, higher‐stakes cases, in which
probation is not a viable sentencing option, judges may rely less on stereotypes and attend in a more carefully
individualized way to offense severity and defendant risk. It is thus uncertain whether we would find clear,
convincing race or gender effects in our data given our focus on murder cases.
The noncapital research also troublingly points to the influence of judge and prosecutor identity. Since there
seems no principled reason why one defendant should receive a longer sentence than another based simply on
the judge or prosecutor assigned to the case, we believe that judge and prosecutor variables should be regarded
as inappropriate sentencing factors.
Finally, the noncapital research also consistently highlights the importance of two notable questionable
variables: place of prosecution and mode of conviction.

D Expectations for Discretionary LWOP Sentencing in Noncapital Murder Cases
Our focus in this article is on discretionary judicial LWOP sentencing in noncapital murder cases. By
"discretionary," we mean that LWOP is not a mandatory minimum—that is, the sentencing judge has the
authority to impose a lesser sentence.
On the one hand, it might be expected that sentencing practices in our cases would mirror capital sentencing
practices. After all, our cases seem analogous to capital cases insofar as they involve the most serious, high‐
profile type of crime, murder, and a potential sentence that is also extremely severe—one that, as noted earlier,
the Supreme Court has found to be closely comparable to the death penalty itself.80 In light of the capital
sentencing research discussed above, the capital‐LWOP analogy would suggest that LWOP sentencing might be
marked by victim race and gender disparities, defendant gender disparities, and geographic disparities.
But, on the other hand, it may be that noncapital sentencing makes for a closer comparison. Most importantly, it
could be that sentencing practices in the capital area are tied to the unique role of the jury in administering the
death penalty. Since we focus here on judicial LWOP sentencing, we might reasonably expect our cases to be
more reflective of the prior research on the predictors of the severity of noncapital prison sentences, as to
which, for instance, judge and prosecutor factors often seem to play an important role.

III. Wisconsin's Sentencing System for First‐Degree Intentional Homicide:
Content and Context
There is no crime formally labeled "murder" in the Wisconsin criminal code, but much of the criminal conduct
that would be classified as murder in other jurisdictions is encompassed within Wisconsin's offenses of first‐
degree intentional homicide81 and first‐degree reckless homicide.82 These offenses roughly correspond to first‐
and second‐degree murder, respectively, in the traditional classification system.83 We focus in this article on
first‐degree intentional homicide, which is treated as a Class A felony.84 In Wisconsin, conviction of a Class A
felony results in a mandatory life term,85 but the sentencing judge has discretion to determine whether the
defendant will be eligible to petition for release some time before death.86 The specifics of the system changed a
few times in the 1980s and 1990s, but, for all killings that occurred on or after December 31, 1999—which
account for 96 percent of our dataset—the sentencing judge has three options: (1) life without any possibility to
petition for release; (2) life with the possibility to petition the sentencing court for release after serving 20 years
in prison; or (3) life with the possibility to petition the sentencing court for release after serving some amount of
time greater than 20 years.87
In comparison to what is found in other states, the Wisconsin system is unusual in some respects, but the
unique features tend to be more in the nature of semantics than substance. Indeed, as more and more states
abolish the death penalty,88 it is likely becoming increasingly common nationally for the LWOP‐or‐less choice to
be presented when murder cases advance to sentencing.
In all, 22 states and the District of Columbia have eliminated capital punishment.89 Out of those 23 jurisdictions,
nine currently require a discretionary choice between LWOP and some lesser punishment for adults convicted of
intentional murder. In addition to Wisconsin, these jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont.90 For instance, in the District of Columbia, a
defendant who is convicted of first‐degree murder faces a sentence of 30 years to LWOP, which leaves the D.C.
judge with a decision that corresponds reasonably closely in practical effect to the Wisconsin judge's decision of
a sentence somewhere between life with eligibility for release at 20 years and life with no possibility of release.
Two other states, Alaska and Connecticut, functionally create a similar LWOP‐or‐less choice insofar as they
establish a maximum sentence that precludes parole release for at least 50 years,91 which might fairly be
characterized as de facto LWOP.92
Additionally, it should be noted that 13 of the death‐penalty jurisdictions also have an LWOP‐or‐less choice that
must be made if a death sentence is not imposed.93 Finally, even in states in which there is not an LWOP‐or‐less
choice for adult murderers, there may be such a choice for juvenile murderers. Indeed, this may be
constitutionally required in some states as a result of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment cases, specifically,
Roper v. Simmons, which prohibited the death penalty for juveniles,94 and Miller v. Alabama, which prohibited
mandatory LWOP for juveniles.95 The constitutional need for a sub‐LWOP option for all juvenile defendants is
now embodied in the murder sentencing statutes of several states.96
In short, despite the unique features of the Wisconsin system, a majority of other states now also require LWOP‐
or‐less sentencing choices to be made in at least some subset of murder cases.

IV. Data and Methodology
A Sources of Data
The data for this study come from several sources, but primarily the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC)
and the Wisconsin Consolidated Court Automation Program (CCAP). An online DOC database tracks current
inmates in the Wisconsin state prison system, while CCAP tracks all civil and criminal case filings in Wisconsin

since the program began in 1987.97 The DOC data included much of the information we required on inmate
offenses and sentences served, but CCAP was necessary for information on court adjudication processes.
Starting with the DOC data, our initial sample included all current inmates in the Wisconsin state prison system
as of August 17–21, 2018.98 That yielded 24,298 individuals. We then restricted the sample to all inmates who
were serving a life sentence and were convicted under Wisconsin Statutes Section 940.01 (first‐degree
intentional homicide) in 2001 or later and processed into the DOC system by August 2018.99 We selected 2001
as the first year of observation because in that year there was a significant technological upgrade to merge two
court system computer departments.100 In our experience, CCAP data before 2001 can be less reliable and rife
with missing values on key covariates.
The foregoing steps yielded a set of 455 individuals who were convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide
between the start of 2001 and about mid‐2018. Since individuals who are convicted of this crime must serve at
least 20 years, we can be reasonably confident that this set of prisoners in mid‐2018 was close to the full set of
individuals who were convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide in Wisconsin in our 2001–2018
timeframe.101
The next step was to match the DOC data to CCAP data. Unfortunately, CCAP does not include DOC identifiers,
which made linking the two datasets a challenge. We did manage to connect them by conducting manual
searches of CCAP using defendant name, county of conviction, and case number—all of which were included in
the DOC data.
The CCAP data revealed that a small number of the 455 cases arose from killings that occurred prior to 2000,
presumably reflecting delays in the discovery of the offense or the apprehension or prosecution of the
perpetrator. In most cases, these time lags did not present a problem for our analysis. However, offenses that
took place before 1988 were sentenced under a different homicide law that did not include judicial discretion
for possible release.102 Therefore, we decided to remove all five of the pre‐1988 cases, leaving a total final
sample of 450 cases.
We also relied on a few additional sources of information for certain covariates, as detailed in Section IV.C.

B Dependent Variable
We label our dependent variable Life With, reflecting the sentencing judge's binary decision in cases of first‐
degree intentional homicide to permit or not permit the defendant to seek release before death.103 In slightly
more than half our cases (54 percent), the judge granted Life With. To be sure, even when a judge leaves open
the possibility of release before death, defendants may still be denied when they apply for release and
ultimately end up serving a whole‐life sentence. Still, consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of the
distinctive hopelessness of the LWOP sentence,104 we assume that the judge's decision on eligibility for potential
release would be regarded as highly consequential by most defendants. Additionally, given the near‐even split in
outcomes in our cases, it seems that judges also regard the decision as meaningful and not one to be made
reflexively in one direction or the other. In any event, we coded cases in which Life With was granted as "1" and
cases in which it was denied as "0."105

C Covariates
We employ a large and diverse grouping of covariates. We divide them into four broad categories of measures:
(1) case‐severity and case‐processing factors, (2) court‐actor characteristics, (3) defendant/victim personal
characteristics, and (4) county‐level covariates. The case‐severity and case‐processing factors include the
following variables:
•

Number of homicide victims in the current case;

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Whether the defendant was charged as a "party to a crime," that it, as a participant in a crime that
included multiple actors (yes = 1; no = 0);106
Whether the state sought a "dangerous weapon" sentence enhancement (yes = 1; no = 0);107
Whether the state sought a "habitual criminality" enhancement (applies when defendant had at least
one prior felony conviction, or at least three prior misdemeanor convictions, in the past five years)
(yes = 1; no = 0);108
Whether the state sought a "domestic violence" enhancement (yes = 1; no = 0);109
Whether the state sought a "hate crime" enhancement (yes = 1; no = 0);110
Whether the defendant pled guilty or no contest, as opposed to going to trial (yes = 1; no = 0);
Whether the defendant was convicted through a jury trial, as opposed to a bench trial or a plea (yes = 1;
no = 0);
Number of earlier or contemporaneous criminal cases in which the defendant was also convicted;111 and
Whether the defendant had an earlier or contemporaneous conviction for another Class A or Class B
felony (yes = 1; no = 0).112

Most of the information for these variables comes from CCAP, except that the criminal history variables come
from DOC and, in most cases, the number of victims was derived from a Supplemental Homicide Report (SHR)
compilation. SHRs are prepared by police agencies in connection with homicide investigations.113 We used an
SHR compilation covering our time period that was provided by the Wisconsin Department of Justice.114
The second grouping of covariates captures the characteristics of the key court actors in the case: judge, defense
counsel, and prosecutor. CCAP included the names of the judge and defense lawyer(s) at the time of sentencing
in all cases.115 It also provided the name of the prosecutor at sentencing in a little over two‐thirds of the cases.116
In the remaining cases where CCAP was unclear, we relied primarily on published news media reports of the
case to identify the prosecutor.117 For judges and district attorneys, we obtained information about the
proximity of reelection dates and whether the official's last election was contested from the Wisconsin Election
Commission.118 We also include measures for whether the defense counsel was appointed by the court (yes = 1;
no = 0), which were taken from CCAP.119 We also examined the role of judge and lawyer gender.120 There was
one defendant who declined counsel and represented himself. This case was removed from the data set when
defense‐counsel variables were analyzed.
We included another variable for all three court actors that may require some discussion. We identified the law
schools that granted the law degrees for all the judges, defense lawyers, and prosecutors included in this study.
The State Bar of Wisconsin has a publicly accessible on‐line database with information about all licensed
attorneys in the state, including law school attended and graduation year.121 Searching by name, we manually
collected information about all the judges and lawyers in our dataset. Not surprisingly, the two most prevalent
law schools by far were Wisconsin's only two in‐state schools: Marquette University and the University of
Wisconsin. We thus initially recoded the law school variable into the three groups: Marquette, Wisconsin, and
out of state. After preliminary analysis, however, we found consistent bivariate relationships between the
dependent variable and judges and prosecutors who received their law degrees from Marquette. To account for
this pattern, we recoded the law school variable so that, Marquette = 1 and all other law schools = 0.
This second grouping of covariates also included:
•
•
•
•

Law school graduation year, which was converted into a years‐out‐of‐law‐school variable;
Number of years of judicial experience;122
Whether the judge was up for reelection within 12 months of case sentencing (yes = 1; no = 0);
Whether the judge's last election was contested (contested = 1; uncontested = 0);

•
•
•
•

Whether the judge had been a prosecutor before becoming a judge (yes = 1; no = 0);123
Whether the judge had previously been a public defender (yes = 1; no = 0);
Number of years since law school for defense counsel and prosecutor; and
Whether the local district attorney was up for reelection within 12 months of sentencing (yes = 1;
no = 0).

The third category of variables captures the personal characteristics of defendants and their victims. Information
on defendants came from the DOC data and includes race, which was recoded into a binary variable (black = 1;
all others = 0); gender (1 = female; 0 = male); and age at the time of offense.124 We coded black as the reference
category to detect for discrimination against black defendants, which prior sentencing research has identified as
an area of concern, as discussed in Section I.125 We were able to secure information on victim demographics
from the SHR,126 which allowed us to include the following covariates: victim race (white = 1; nonwhite = 0);127
victim gender (female = 1; male = 0); victim age; and whether the victim was a current or former intimate
partner of the suspect (yes = 1; no = 0). In cases, where there was more than one victim, we coded race and
gender so that if any one of the victims was white or a woman, the value would be 1.
The final covariates are county‐level characteristics. Unlike some other states, Wisconsin's judicial districts are
organized along county lines, which makes county‐level variables the appropriate means to study the effect of
geographic variation. To detect whether such variation coincides with the likelihood of a judge granting Life
With, we included several variables. Demographic county‐level data were taken from the Wisconsin Department
of Health Services,128 which relies on U.S. Census population estimates. We pulled unemployment data from the
U.S. Department of Labor Unemployment Statistics Map of Wisconsin.129 We also included violent crime rate by
county based on data from the Wisconsin Department of Justice.130 To link these aggregate measures to the case
at hand, we used the year that the sentence was given as the year from which to draw county‐level estimates.
We also collected information on county‐level estimates for the year before the sentence in order to calculate
change scores. This step allowed us to observe whether changes in racial composition, the unemployment rate,
and/or violent crime are tied to sentencing outcomes. Finally, we included a county‐level political context
variable that captures the average percent in a given county that voted for Republican presidential candidates in
the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016.131

D Analytic Approach
As previously stated, our analytic approach for this study focuses on the Life With versus Life Without (LWOP)
decision. Since this is a binary variable, we rely on analytic techniques reserved for categorical and limited
dependent variables. We first begin our analysis with a discussion of the sample distributions and means. We
proceed by discussing the results of the difference in means tests and chi‐square cross‐classification tests of
significance. Lastly, we present and discuss the results of our regression models.132
We also pare down the number of covariates in our final models to avoid problems with overfitting.133 With a
sample of 450, we avoid these potential issues as our final model includes only 23 covariates. We excluded most
variables that did not share a bivariate relationship with Life With, especially if they did not have a clear
theoretical justification for inclusion. It was also necessary to selectively omit specific county‐level measures in
the final models due to issues with multicollinearity. Most of Wisconsin's nonwhite population is concentrated in
just a few counties located in the southeast portion of the state, which tend to be the same counties that have
the highest concentrations of inequality, unemployment, and crime.134 The close relationship between these
variables creates problems with analysis when they are included in a single model. To counter these potential
problems, we focus on violent crime rate in the year of the sentence and the two‐year change in violent crime

rate, in addition to the aggregate measure of political conservatism. This decision was also informed by bivariate
analysis, which revealed a relationship between Life With and the violent crime measures.135

V. Results and Findings
A Descriptive Statistics
We first discuss the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1. The demographic composition of the defendants
in these cases is consistent with broader patterns for homicide offenders. For example, the vast majority of
individuals currently incarcerated for intentional homicide in these data are men (96 percent).136 The racial
composition of these prisoners is also comparable to national trends with 46 percent of the offenders being
identified as black; 49 percent white; 3.6 percent American Indian; and 0.9 percent Asian American.137
(Unfortunately, our data do not include any indication of Hispanic/Latinx ethnicity.) Finally, the average age at
offense of the prisoners in our sample was about 30.5 years.138
1 Table Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Life With
Case‐Severity and Case‐Processing Factors
Another Class A or B felony
Party to a crime
Dangerous weapon
Habitual criminality
Domestic violence
Jury trial
Guilty or no‐contest plea
Number of victims
Number of prior‐conviction cases
Court Actors
Judge gender (woman = 1)
Judge law school (Marquette = 1)
Years as judge
Judge up for reelection (yes = 1)
Judge ran in contested election (yes = 1)
Was judge previously prosecutor (yes =1)
Was judge previously public defender (yes = 1)
Defense lawyer gender (woman = 1)
Defense lawyer law school (Marquette = 1)
Court‐appointed defense lawyer (yes = 1)
Years out of law school of defense lawyer
Prosecutor gender (woman = 1)
Prosecutor law school (Marquette = 1)
Years out of law school of prosecutor
DA up for reelection (yes = 1)
Defendant/Victim Characteristics
Defendant race (black = 1)
Defendant gender (woman = 1)
Defendant age at offense
Victim race (white =1)
Victim gender (woman = 1)

N
Range
450 0–1

Mean (SD)
0.54 (0.50)

450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450

0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
1–4
0–15

0.25 (0.43)
0.29 (0.46)
0.38 (0.49)
0.10 (0.30)
0.04 (0.21)
0.72 (0.45)
0.27 (0.44)
1.12 (0.48)
1.9 (2.40)

450
450
450
450
450
450
450
449
449
449
449
450
450
450
450

0–1
0–1
0–32
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
0–1
3–53
0–1
0–1
1–41
0–1

0.17 (0.38)
0.26 (0.44)
12.87 (7.68)
0.18 (0.38)
0.14 (0.35)
0.42 (0.49)
0.05 (0.22)
0.17 (0.38)
0.34 (0.47)
0.72 (0.45)
23.86 (9.50)
0.15 (0.35)
0.40 (0.49)
21.68 (8.35)
0.20 (0.40)

450
450
450
404
450

0–1
0–1
14–76
0–1
0–1

0.46 (0.50)
0.04 (0.20)
30.51 (10.73)
0.58 (0.49)
0.41 (0.49)

Victim age
Victim intimate partner (yes = 1)
Aggregate (County‐Level) Measures
Unemployment rate
Violent crime rate
Percent black/Latinx
Percent of the population under 18
Change in unemployment rate
Change in violent crime rate
Change in percent black/Latinx
Mean Republican

450 0–1
450 0–1

27.88 (0.36)
0.18 (0.38)

450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450

0.06 (0.02)
439.8 (343.6)
0.21 (0.16)
0.237 (0.018)
0.0001 (0.01)
10.0 (66.56)
0.004 (0.003)
0.42 (0.10)

0.022–0.13
18.5–1077.6
0.005–0.44
0.14–0.28
−0.02–0.06
−184.6–195.5
−0.003–009
0.28–0.68

When examining victim characteristics, we observe some patterns consistent with broader homicide trends, but
we also observe at least one key departure. At the outset, we note that the victim race variable is missing in
about 10 percent of our cases; we thus cautiously report estimates of this variable. When victim race was
available, 58 percent involved a victim who was White. The average victim age was just under 28, and 18
percent of the cases involved an intimate partner.
More strikingly, 41 percent of the victims in our sample are female. This stands in marked contrast to the overall
state homicide data, in which 21% of victims are female.139 Similarly, in national data, women comprise about 22
percent of homicide victims.140 There seem two possible explanations for the prevalence of female victims in our
cases. First, women may disproportionately be the victim of the most culpable intentional homicides, in
comparison to homicides that are accidental or otherwise mitigated. Second, regardless of the underlying facts,
legal decisionmakers may tend to view homicides with female victims as more culpable, leading, for instance, to
a higher likelihood that female‐victim offenses would be charged as first‐degree intentional homicides, as
opposed to a less severe homicide offense.141 However, our data do not permit us to test these hypotheses.
With regard to the case‐severity and case‐processing factors, 25 percent of the defendants had at least one
additional conviction for a Class A or B felony beyond the first‐degree intentional homicide of interest, 29
percent were charged as a party to a crime, 38 percent were charged with a dangerous weapon enhancement,
10 percent were charged with a habitual criminality enhancement, and 4 percent included a domestic violence
enhancement.142 We also observe that most of the cases included in our analysis were decided by a jury trial (72
percent). The mean number of homicide victims in these cases was 1.19, while the defendants had on average
1.9 prior‐conviction cases reflected in the DOC records.
The court‐actor variables also lead to some noteworthy findings. To begin, most of the judges (83 percent),
defense attorneys (83 percent), and prosecutors (85 percent) are men.143 Next, very few of the cases (14
percent) involved a judge who had faced an opponent in his or her most recent election or reelection bid. The
proportion of court actors who received their law degree from Marquette Law School varied from 26 percent for
judges, to 34 percent for defense attorneys, to 40 percent for prosecutors. The data also indicate that 72
percent of the defense attorneys were court appointed.
The mean county‐level unemployment rate during the period of observation was 6 percent. The mean
black/Latinx proportion by county was 21 percent. We also draw attention to partisan voting patterns in
presidential elections; the mean county‐level GOP vote for our cases was 42 percent —reflecting, in part, the
prevalence in our data of cases from heavily Democratic Milwaukee.144

B Bivariate Analysis

Our bivariate analysis uncovered several notable patterns.145 First, we found a connection between sentencing
outcomes and victim gender, with female‐victim cases more likely to result in LWOP. More specifically, in
Table 2, with victim gender as columns and the Life With variable across rows, we find a difference of about 16
percentage points in the likelihood that a defendant with a female victim will receive leniency in comparison
with a defendant with a male victim, a percentage difference that is statistically significant.
2 Table Cross‐Classification Table for Life with and Female Victim
Male Victim Female Victim Totals
LWOP
105 (39.5%) 102 (55.4%)
207 (46%)
Life With 161 (60.5%) 82 (44.5%)
243 (54%)
Totals
266 (100%) 184 (100%)
450 (100%)
Notes: Chi‐square = 11.16** (p < 0.01). We use ** to indicate a probability of less than 1 percent (i.e., p < 0.01)
that an apparent relationship between variables (here, sentence and victim gender) is due to random variability
or chance.
To continue unpacking the role of gender in case adjudication, we split the cross‐classification table by black
male and other defendants. (The number of female defendants is too small to permit further breakdown of the
data along those lines.) As indicated in Table 2, when statistically controlling for the race and gender of the
defendant, we found that for nonblack male defendants, the gap in outcomes between female‐ and male‐victim
cases decreased from 16 to 9 percentage points—and was no longer statistically significant. By contrast, with
black male defendants, the difference in receiving LWOP between cases with a female versus a male victim
increased to 24.5 percentage points and retained statistical significance. Black men convicted of killing women
were significantly more likely to be given LWOP (by nearly 25 percentage points) than were black men who were
convicted of killing other men. Otherwise stated, the connection between victim gender and sentencing may be
conditioned by defendant variables, with victim gender seemingly more salient in cases involving black
defendants than white ones. In particular, we note that among the four defendant‐victim categories explored in
Table 3, the group most likely to receive Life With was black male defendants who killed other men. This pattern
could possibly reflect, for instance, negative perceptions regarding the behavior or character of the victims in
these cases.146
3 Table Cross‐Classification Table for Life With, Female Victim, and Black Male Defendant
Male Victim Female Victim Totals
Nonblack Male Defendant
LWOP
55 (44%)
63 (52.9%)
118 (48.4%)
Life With
70 (56%)
56 (47.1%)
126 (51.6%)
Totals
125 (100%) 119 (100%)
244 (100%)
Chi‐square = 1.95
Black Male Defendant
LWOP
50 (35.5%)
39 (60%)
89 (43.2%)
Life With
91 (64.5%)
26 (40%)
117 (56.8%)
Totals
141 (100%) 65 (100%)
206 (100%)
Chi‐square = 10.92**
Notes: We use ** to indicate a probability of less than 1 percent (i.e., p < 0.01) that an apparent relationship
between variables (here, sentence and victim gender) is due to random variability or chance.

To test whether the age of defendants is linked to sentencing leniency, we conducted t tests, which show that
the mean age of defendants who were given Life Without was 33.63 years, while the mean age of defendants
who were given Life With was 27.86 years. This difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001). The finding
indicates that younger defendants are more likely to receive sentencing leniency than are older ones. We also
conducted a test of whether the mean age for black defendants is different than the mean age for nonblack
defendants, which did prove to be the case. The mean age for black defendants was 27.64 and the mean age for
nonblack defendants was 33.52 (p < 0.001), demonstrating that black defendants tend to be younger than
nonblack ones. It seems that younger defendants are treated with more leniency, and that black defendants are
on average younger. We reexamine the connection between age, race, and sentencing in greater depth when
we discuss the results of the regression models.
We find several additional variables that share a bivariate relationship with sentencing leniency. The data
indicate that defendants with more prior convictions are significantly less likely to receive leniency, as are
defendants convicted of an additional Class A or B felony. Defendants who were sentenced by judges who were
up for reelection within a year of the case were significantly less likely to receive sentencing leniency, as were
defendants who were prosecuted by graduates of Marquette Law School. As the number of victims increased,
so, too, did the defendant's chances of receiving LWOP.147 As the county in which defendants were sentenced
became increasingly Republican during the period of observation, the likelihood that they would receive
sentencing leniency declined. Curiously, counties with higher rates of violent crime or increasing violent crime
rates corresponded with increased likelihood of receiving Life With.

C Multivariate Regression Models
The final step of our analysis was to observe statistically controlled relationships for all the variables
simultaneously. As previously noted, we trimmed the variables included in the binary logit regression models. To
be included, covariates had to either share a statistically significant relationship with Life With at the bivariate
level or be identified as a significant correlate of sentencing outcomes in prior studies (capital or noncapital). We
employed a step‐wise model approach, as indicated in Table 4. Model 1 includes only the case‐severity and case‐
processing factors, while Model 2 also includes the court‐actor characteristics, and the like.
4 Table Binary Logit Models for Life With Decision (Leniency)
Variable
Model 1
Case‐Severity and Case‐Processing Factors
Class A or B felony
−1.04 (0.28)
Weapon
0.59 (0.23)
Habitual criminality
−0.68 (0.36)
Jury trial
−0.53 (0.89)
Guilty or NC plea
−0.12 (0.90)
Number of victims
−0.49 (0.36)
Number of prior‐ conviction cases
−0.14 (0.045)
Court Actors
Judge gender (woman = 1)
Judge MU law
Judge reelection
Judge was defense
Judge was prosecutor
Court appointed defense
Prosecutor gender (woman = 1)
Prosecutor MU law

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

−1.11 (0.30)
0.79 (0.24)
−0.87 (0.38)
−0.60 (0.90)
−0.13 (0.91)
−0.53 (0.38)
−0.11 (0.05)

−1.24 (0.31)
0.50 (.26)
−0.99 (0.39)
−1.26 (0.97)
−0.61 (0.98)
−0.47 (0.39)
−0.09 (0.05)

−1.39 (0.32)
0.24 (0.27)
−0.88 (0.41)
−1.45 (1.01)
−0.78 (1.02)
−0.57 (.40)
−0.10 (.05)

0.23 (0.28)
−0.44 (0.24)
−0.53 (0.28)
−0.46 (0.48)
0.58 (0.22)
0.08 (0.27)
−0.05 (0.30)
−0.61 (0.22)

0.065 (0.30)
−0.39 (.25)
−0.40 (.29)
−0.36 (0.51)
0.54 (.23)
0.02 (0.29)
−0.01 (0.32)
−0.58 (0.23)

0.04 (.31)
−0.26 (.26)
−0.43 (.30)
−0.60 (.55)
0.59 (.24)
0.07 (.30)
−0.17 (.34)
−0.54 (.25)

DA reelection
Def/Vic Characteristics
Defendant race (black = 1)
Defendant gender (woman = 1)
Defendant age
Victim gender (woman = 1)
Aggregate‐Level Measures
Violent crime rate
Change in violent crime
Average Republican
Constant
Pseudo R2
N
* p < 0.05;
** p < 0.01;
*** p < 0.001.

0.30 (0.26)

1.0 (.88)
0.084
450

0.45 (.51)
0.123
450

0.26 (0.27)

0.29 (.28)

0.14 (0.24)
0.94 (0.63)
−.06 (0.01)
−.36 (0.21)

−0.11 (.64)
−0.95 (.64)
−0.06 (0.012)
−0.27 (0.21)

3.59 (1.13)
0.181
450

−0.0003 (0.0006)
0.004 (0.001)
−4.92 (1.76)
6.26(1.51)
0.20
450

The results of Model 1 in Table 4 show three statistically significant covariates. Defendants were less likely to
receive Life With when they had a prior or contemporaneous conviction for another Class A or B felony
(β = −1.04; p < 0.001), which echoes frequent findings in both the capital and noncapital sentencing literature
that criminal history seems to play a significant role in sentencing decisions.148 Similarly, Model 1 also indicates
that the likelihood of leniency in our cases declined as the number of prior‐conviction cases increased (β = −0.14;
p < 0.01). Surprisingly, though, we found that the chances of leniency actually increased when prosecutors
sought a dangerous weapon enhancement.149 The pseudo R2 of Model 1 suggests that approximately 8.4
percent of the variance across the dependent variable is captured by these factors.150
The results of Model 2 in Table 4 are similar to those of Model 1 with regard to the case‐severity and case‐
processing factors, except now we observe that the habitual criminality enhancement variable is statistically
significant. This finding again highlights the seeming importance of criminal history to the sentencing decision.
Model 2 of Table 4 also indicates two statistically significant court‐actor measures. Cases with judges who were
former prosecutors were significantly more likely to result in a Life With sentence (β = 0.58; p < 0.01). While
seemingly counterintuitive, it could be the case that judges who had been prosecuting attorneys feel less
compelled as a political matter to demonstrate a "tough‐on‐crime" approach to sentencing. We also found that
cases with prosecutors who graduated from Marquette Law School were less likely to result in Life With
(β = −0.61; p < 0.05). We are unable to determine an underlying cause of this "law school effect" with the
available data. For instance, there may be self‐selection dynamics, for example, future prosecutors who attend
Marquette Law School may tend to bring more punitive attitudes with them to law school, which may translate
later in their careers to a greater tendency to push for more severe sentences. Alternatively, there may be
something in the law school experience itself, such as a more formalist approach by the faculty to teaching law,
that in some enduring way affects the attitudes or practices of former students who become prosecutors.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Marquette and most of the other law schools represented in our
data lies in Marquette's religious (Catholic) affiliation, which might plausibly contribute to either self‐selection or
institutional‐experience effects. In any event, by whatever underlying mechanism, our results do suggest that
the background or personal characteristics of court actors shape the litigation of homicide cases in ways that
may, in the aggregate, affect sentencing outcomes. Our findings in Model 2 thus echo a finding common in the
extant noncapital‐sentencing research that sentences are affected by the specific judges and prosecutors
working on a given case.151 However, we are not aware of any earlier studies that specifically examined the

judge and prosecutor background variables that we found to be significant. With the addition of these variables,
the pseudo R2 jumps to 12.3 percent in Model 2.
We observe some key changes in Model 3 in Table 4. Here, only two factors from Model 1 are significant net of
defendant and victim characteristics. As in Model 2, defendants who have another prior or contemporaneous
Class A or B felony or who are subject to a habitual criminality enhancement were less likely to receive Life With.
Also, the two court‐actor variables that were significant in Model 2 remain significant in Model 3. The defendant
and victim characteristics added in this model were defendant race, defendant gender, defendant age, and
victim gender, but only one of these variables proved to be significant: age of defendant (β = −0.06; p < 0.001).
Consistent with the capital sentencing research, older defendants in our data were less likely to receive
sentencing leniency than were younger ones.152 We also observe the pseudo R2 estimate increase from 12.3
percent to 18.1 percent.
As noted in Section I, the death‐penalty research consistently finds that victim race is a significant predictor of
sentencing outcomes in murder cases. Because we lacked victim‐race data in about 10 percent of our cases, we
were not able to include this notable covariate in our analysis of the full sample. However, in light of the
potential importance of racial effects in this area, we completed a separate set of parallel analyses using just the
cases for which victim race was known. Following the same step‐wise model‐building approach that we used
with the full sample, victim race proved non‐significant in all the models.153
Model 4 of Table 4, or the full model, contains all the previous covariates, but now also includes aggregate
county measures. All the covariates that were found to be significant in Model 3 are also significant in Model 4.
Additionally, cases that were sentenced in counties with increasing rates of violent crime were more likely to
result in lenience. While this finding is unexpected and somewhat unusual,154 it seems plausible that law‐
enforcement and court resources in counties with increasing violent crime are under particular strain, which
may impede the ability of police and prosecutors to put together the strongest possible cases against
defendants and may otherwise incentivize prosecutors to take more generous plea‐bargaining positions so as to
resolve cases more quickly. There may also be a measure of jadedness that sets in during a period of increasing
violent crime.
We also found that counties with higher average rates of Republican voters during presidential elections were
associated with lower likelihoods of leniency (β = −4.92; p < 0.01). This replicates a finding in some, but not all,
prior studies that have attempted to determine whether there is a link between county political orientation and
sentencing outcomes.155 Additionally, we note that the pseudo R2 in Model 4 of Table 4 increases to 20.0
percent.
The final step in our analysis was to focus on the way in which age is tied to sentencing outcomes. To do so, we
estimated conditional probabilities for Life With while setting all other covariates at their global mean. We then
calculated the conditional probabilities at each defendant age included in the sample, which ranged from 14 to
76. We illustrate these conditional probabilities, and their 95 percent confidence intervals, at each age in
Figure 1.

1 Conditional probabilities of receiving leniency for the full sample with 95 percent CIs.

At the earliest ages, defendants have nearly an 80 percent chance of receiving Life With holding all other
covariates at their global means. For the oldest defendants, there is less than a 10 percent chance of leniency. At
34 years of age, the chance of receiving leniency drops below 50 percent, indicating the threshold where the
odds are 50–50.
We also calculated the same probabilities separately for black and nonblack defendants. Figure 2 indicates the
conditional probabilities of receiving Life With over the 14–76 age range for each group. Figure 2 shows a
downward trend similar to the conditional probabilities for the entire sample, but black defendants are slightly
less likely to receive leniency at each age examined. The difference between the two groups is fairly minor
ranging from approximately one to three percentage points.

2 Conditional probabilities of receiving leniency for black and nonblack defendants by age.
To arrive at a clearer sense of the gap between the conditional probability for black and nonblack defendants,
we also illustrate this difference in Figure 3. The figure shows an interesting pattern in which the gap between
black and nonblack defendants increases to nearly 3 percentage points until approximately a defendant's mid‐
30s and then falls throughout the remaining ages and approaches convergence when defendants face
sentencing during their 60s. These findings support the notion that a defendant's race plays a complicated and
possibly even changing role in sentencing as defendants age. Ultimately, however, our data indicate that a
defendant's race is not the most central or influential variable in explaining why some intentional homicide
cases result in LWOP and others do not.

3 Black–nonblack difference in conditional probabilities of leniency by age.

VI. Policy Implications
Some readers may have a good news/bad news reaction to our analysis. First, the good news. Consistent with
widely—albeit not universally—accepted normative views of sentencing, we find that intentional‐homicide
defendants who have more serious criminal histories are more likely to receive LWOP, even holding constant a
diverse set of covariates. This suggests that the judges in these cases are, at least to some extent, attending to
legally relevant case‐specific sentencing considerations.

Similarly, defendant age, another of our significant covariates, should probably also be regarded as an
appropriate consideration. As the Supreme Court has emphasized in cases like Roper v. Simmons156 and Miller v.
Alabama,157 younger defendants tend to have lower culpability and better rehabilitative prospects than older
defendants.158 Additionally, it may be appropriate to regard LWOP as a harsher sentence for younger than older
defendants because a whole‐life sentence will likely translate into more years in prison for the younger
defendant.
Moreover, in contrast to numerous studies of murder sentencing in death‐penalty states, our multivariate
regression models show no indication of a statistically significant relationship between sentencing outcomes and
either victim race, victim gender, defendant race, or defendant gender. To be sure, though, any reassurance
offered by this analysis must be tempered by an appreciation that a finding of non‐significance is not the same
thing as concluding that race or gender have no importance or role in sentencing outcomes; we cannot rule out
the possibility that an analysis with a larger number of cases or a different array of covariates would reveal
subtle race or gender effects that are not captured by our current models.159 Indeed, our bivariate cross‐
classification analysis suggests that victim gender, defendant gender, and defendant race may interact with one
another in significant ways, although our sample size is not large enough to determine whether these
interaction effects would hold up if other variables were held constant. Similarly, our age‐race conditional
probabilities analysis may also point to subtle race effects.
Some may also find it reassuring that we found no evidence of a "trial penalty," that is, a significant relationship
between sentence and mode of conviction.
On the "bad news" side of the ledger might be indications that sentencing outcomes are influenced by the
identity of the judge and prosecutor. There is no apparent normative rationale for punishment to turn on the
professional or educational background of the key courtroom actors, whose assignment to the case may be an
arbitrary matter. Of course, as noted in Section I, it is a common finding in empirical sentencing research that
the identities of the judge and prosecutor matter, but this aspect of sentencing reality may be regarded as
particularly troubling when the stakes are as high as they are in first‐degree intentional homicide cases, when
the extreme sentence of LWOP is on the table.
It may also be regarded as troubling that outcomes are seemingly influenced by county‐specific social and
political factors. On the one hand, it may to some extent be desirable for sentences to reflect the needs and
values of the community in which the crime occurred. This is, after all, a locale that is likely to experience the
harm of the offense far more acutely than other communities and thus have a uniquely compelling stake in the
penal response. Moreover, the place of prosecution is not arbitrary in the same sense as the identity of the
judge and prosecutor, but normally flows from the perpetrator's decision about where to commit the crime.160
Additionally, a policy preference for some localization in the administration of justice seems implicit in the
state's system of electing trial court judges and district attorneys at the county level. Yet, on the other hand, it
remains the case that the locally accountable district attorneys prosecute in the name of the state, not the
county. It is, moreover, a state agency, the Department of Corrections, that administers sentences of
imprisonment, and hence state taxpayers who collectively assume financial responsibility for those sentences.
Indeed, as other criminologists have observed, local control over sentencing creates a sort of free‐rider
problem—a "correctional free lunch," so to speak.161 Through their imprisonment‐related decisions, local
officials are able to rid their communities of troublesome individuals and appeal to voters' tough‐on‐crime
instincts without having to fully bear the resulting fiscal burdens. Resources like imprisonment that can be used
at no or relatively low cost to the "consumer" may tend to be over‐utilized relative to their full costs and
benefits.

On balance, we think the evidence of inappropriate and questionable influences over LWOP sentencing warrants
attention by policymakers. We think consideration should be given to reforms that would focus attention at
sentencing more squarely on core considerations of defendant culpability and criminal history, and that would
promote greater case‐to‐case, county‐to‐county uniformity in the assessment and weighing of these
considerations.
We recognize that a half‐century of efforts to bring greater uniformity to U.S. sentencing have likely produced
more failures than successes.162 In particular, the history of the federal sentencing guidelines offers a sobering
reminder that centralized command‐and‐control approaches to sentencing are apt to produce considerable
unfairness and may be routinely circumvented by judges and prosecutors in ways that are difficult to monitor
and correct.163 At the same time, we believe that the difficulties with such guideline systems derive in large part
from the profound conceptual challenges raised by attempts to fit highly diverse sets of offenses into a single,
coherent penal scheme, and by the equally vexing practical impediments to achieving widespread guidelines
compliance in a justice system that is dominated by plea bargaining.164 The prospects for fair, effective
centralized guidance may be stronger when the guidance focuses only on a single offense—especially when that
offense is of such extreme gravity that guilty pleas are the exception, not the rule. Even at that, uniformity goals
should be modest, with some room allowed for discretion and localization. Inflexible rules—for example,
automatic LWOP in all multiple‐victim cases—are apt to produce injustice, circumvention, or both.
The criteria and procedures used for capital sentencing may, in a very general sense, serve as a model for LWOP
sentencing. Under the shadow of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, death‐penalty states
have adopted narrowing statutes that are designed, at least nominally, to limit capital sentences to the worst of
the worst.165 These statutes include lists of aggravating circumstances and require that at least one aggravating
circumstance be found before the defendant can be considered for death.166 Even then, a capital sentence is not
automatic, but must be based on a case‐specific weighing of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.167
In practice, the weakness of such narrowing statutes has been that they include too many aggravating
circumstances, some of which tend to be rather vague, such as whether the murder was especially "heinous,
cruel or depraved."168 Such statutes are poorly designed to ensure that capital punishment truly is reserved for
the worst of the worst.169
If the concept of statutory narrowing is transposed to the LWOP context, as we think merits consideration, the
list of aggravating circumstances ought to be relatively short and objective in character. As a starting point for
discussion, we propose the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Whether there were multiple homicide victims in the case;
Whether the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the victim to suffer severe, protracted pain or
psychological distress;
Whether the victim was below the age of 18;
Whether the killing was planned in advance; and
Whether the defendant had a prior conviction and prison sentence for a felony‐level crime of
violence.170

Further mirroring the constitutional safeguards in place for capital sentencing, consideration should also be
given to categorical restrictions on who is subject to LWOP, such as juveniles,171 the intellectually disabled,172
and the severely mentally ill.173
One arguable downside of our proposal is that defendants would have a constitutional right to a jury trial on the
aggravating factors.174 This would not only make LWOP sentencing somewhat more procedurally cumbersome,

but would also introduce the potential for the disparities and biases that are associated with jury decision
making, as in the capital‐sentencing arena. On the other hand, if the aggravating circumstances are such that
their presence or absence can be readily determined, as we think would be the case with those that we have
suggested, the necessary fact‐finding could be performed quickly and conveniently post‐conviction by the trial
jury, with less room for improper considerations to influence the outcomes. The ultimate weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances could still potentially be performed by a judge.175
A substantial argument remains that LWOP should simply be eliminated altogether. Perfectly consistent,
coherent decision‐making based exclusively on legally and morally defensible considerations cannot likely be
achieved in any sentencing system designed and administered by human beings. Some real‐world messiness
may be tolerable when judges are choosing between relatively modest sentences, say, a three‐year prison term
versus a five‐year prison term. However, when the stakes are as high as they are with LWOP sentencing, it may
be appropriate to demand a higher level of decisional quality than is actually feasible in practice.
Frustrated by the nation's lack of progress in improving the consistency and parsimony of capital sentencing in
the 1990s, Justice Harry Blackmun famously declared that he would no longer "tinker with the machinery of
death" and adopted a position of categorical opposition to capital punishment.176 It may be similarly futile to
"tinker with the machinery of life," as we have proposed. We take no position on this difficult and increasingly
pressing question. We simply urge, if research continues to indicate that LWOP sentencing is influenced by
inappropriate or questionable factors, that a due regard for the profound severity of the LWOP sentence
warrants—at a minimum—the adoption of new safeguards regarding its use.
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115 If the defendant had more than one defense counsel of record at the time of sentencing, we identified one
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